Abstract: This article describes how Australia's metadata retention and disclosure regime addresses the retention and disclosure of location information and location identifiers by locally licensed telecommunications service providers and those that do not require a licence to operate in Australia. It specifically addresses over the-top-content and communications services. It proposes the three-tier TelCo and the two-tier Content and Communications Service Provider framework in the Service Provider-Retention-Disclosure Obligation Relationship Table, as the lens through which to understand the roles of the various parties.
addressed the privacy impacts of mobile phone data location, arguing the Regime, as it was then, should be reconfigured to afford better privacy protection to the individual. The peculiarities of OTT content and communications services and the various TelCo were however not considered. Abbas et al (2013) sketched and proposed a LBS regulatory framework in the Australian social context. Although the authors recognised that LBS are bound by surveillance, telecommunications, privacy and national security legislation, they concluded the framework existing at the time did not adequately address location information. They also concluded that the 2013 framework inadequately addressed the themes and challenges in the conceptual framework. They concluded:
A number of issues inevitably emerge upon closer examination of the current LBS regulatory framework in Australia. With regards to privacy legislation, it was noted that (location) information derived from LBS solutions might or might not be personal information and is unlikely to be sensitive personal information. The Privacy Act may not cover the data. Regarding Australian telecommunications legislation, location information may not specifically be classed 'telecommunications data' in all circumstances. The locationdependent carriage service introduces ambiguity regarding definitions (Abbas et al., 2013, p. 585) .
Furthermore, in 2013, Abbas et al. (2013) found that the framework does not account for location information generated by LBS, due to its technology-neutral approach. Recent legal developments have since specifically addressed location information in respect of LBS ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth) ," Section 187A(4)(c). Michael & Michael (2011) discussed the social and behavioural implications of LBS in the current global "uberveillance" environment and the risks to privacy. They stated that the way forward regarding the social implications of LBS may be to see it play out in a court of law or to introduce legislation to curb potential harm. Michael & Michael (2011) however cautioned that the right balance should be struck by such regulatory measures so as not to stifle the development of the technology. The Regime has undergone major changes since 2008 and The TelCo is therefore required to retain the following types of location information if the TelCo used the information to provide the service:
 International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI),  International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI),  IP addresses,  port numbers in respect of OTT content and communications services, which in turn are multi-media communications such as in  e-mail,
 instant messages or  video communication (Explanatory Memorandum, 2015: pp. 47-48) .
The degree to which this duty applies to a given TelCo and the OTT content and communications service provider is critically discussed below.
The Regime commenced on 13 October 2015 requiring the TelCo to retain location information and location identifiers in respect of the telecommunications services provided and the communications carried ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth) ," s 187A and 187AA).
The information retained in respect of the telecommunications equipment or a line used in connection with communication, must be retained for a minimum two-year period ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth) ," Section 187AA(1) items 2, 3, and 6 and Section 187C). The information of the equipment or the line to be retained, is the physical or logical location at the time a communication starts and the location at the time the communication ends ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth) ," Section 187AA(1) item 6 ).
The law enforcement and national security agencies authorise the disclosure and the use of the location information and device identifiers by and for themselves, without a judicial warrant being required. The TelCo may voluntarily disclose the information to the agencies for the purpose of law enforcement and national security ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth) ," Sections 172 -184 ).
This retention and disclosure scheme is enforced by means of civil penalty provisions ("Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) The three-tier TelCo and the two-tier Content and Communications Service Provider framework
As can be seen from the discussion above, the degree to which the legal obligation to retain and disclose location information and location identifiers is imposed, is largely dependent on the combination of the nature of the telecommunications service and the type of TelCo providing the service. It is also dependent on its distribution and access; who controls and owns the infrastructure; and its configuration ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth) ," Section 187A (1), (3) and (4).
Three tiers of TelCo may be identified in the telecommunications industry:
 the licensed carrier,  the CSP and  OTT content providers.
Whereas the first two are regulated by the Regime, the latter may not be (Fair, 2016) . This paper however identifies five role players in the OTT content and communications services provider chain. Their respective nature and how that relates to their retention and disclosure Telstra may be operating the service itself, on top of its own IMS network or it may be a licensed service which would classify Telstra as either a Category A or C TelCo with varying retention obligations.
The location of the device is determined by using the cellular network of the TelCo, probably assisted by the GPS and the TOA and TDOA methods (ETSI, 2016b: p. 14) . In this instance, the operator may be required to retain the approximate location and location identifiers of the device. These services may use a combination of USSD, WAP (IP network) and the cellular network, to provide the service and to determine the approximate location of the device. The infrastructure that is used is owned and operated by Telstra, as the Telco. Telstra is required to retain the location of the device in its network, when the customer is requesting the content via SMS and the content is delivered via SMS, using the cellular network.
Telstra may then be required to retain and disclose the location information and location identifiers of the device that is accessing and using the OTT content and communications service provided by it. These appear to be the OTT content and communications services 
Limitation of information to be retained
There are limitations on the extent to which OTT content and communications services are subject to the obligation to retain and disclose location information and location identifiers.
The first exception
Location information about a telecommunications device, the service or the communication information that states an address to which a communication was sent on the Internet, from a telecommunications device, using an Internet access service provided by the Category A, B or C TelCo; and that was obtained by the Category A, B or C TelCo only as a result of providing the Internet access service, is not required to be retained.
The Category A, B or C TelCo is not required to retain location information and location identifiers about a user's web browsing history ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth)," Section 187A(4)(b)).
The destination IP addresses, the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) port numbers and other
The policy position appears to be that a URL is considered to be content of a communication,
but that in certain instances it may be telecommunications data: 'The provision is required because a URL is in some cases telecommunications data rather than content' (Explanatory Memorandum, 2015: p. 43).
It would appear that for a URL to be disclosed, the law enforcement agencies may not use the warrantless telecommunications metadata authorisation and disclosure process. This is however an issue that requires further investigation and clarification, both from a policy and a legal perspective.
However, the TelCo is required to retain location information and location identifiers that state an address from which a communication was received using an Internet access service 
The second exception
The Category A, B or C TelCo is not required to retain, and may therefore not be required to disclose, location information and location identifiers that relates to a communication that is being carried by means of another service and that is operated by a third party. This third party is using the relevant service operated by the Category A, B or C TelCo. The information could be contained in a physical document ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth)," Section 187A(4)(c)). The
TelCo may be required to retain and disclose the information if it has it available (Explanatory Memorandum, 2015: pp. 43-44) and ("TIA Act 1979 (Cth)," Sections 172 -184).
The general rule is, information and identifiers such as destination IP addresses, the URL port numbers and other Internet identifiers in respect of OTT content and communications services are required to be retained (Explanatory Memorandum, 2015: p. 43). However, if the latter data is generated from an OTT content and communications service that is 
Control of Infrastructure Owns and controls the telecommunications infrastructure (access and core network).

Service Provided
Third-party licensed OTT content and communications service, e.g. Blackberry application.
Uses or does not use the location information
The network and the device uses the LCS functionality (location information and location identifiers) to provide the service the device is connected to.
The TelCo may use some location identifiers to invoice the customer.
Retention Obligation
The TelCo is not obliged to retain location information nor the location identifiers. The TelCo may choose to retain location information and the location identifiers.
Disclosure Obligation
The TelCo is required to disclose the location information and location identifiers if it has the information available, under an authorisation issued by the agencies.
The only URI the TelCo is not required to retain nor disclose without a warrant to the agencies, which appears to be considered content, is the URL.
Power of agencies to access and use the information
The law enforcement and national security agencies may authorise the TelCo to disclose the location information and location identifiers if the TelCo has the information available.
Service Provider The Category B TelCo
Control of Infrastructure Leases the telecommunications infrastructure (access and/or core network) from the Category A TelCo.
Service Provided
Third-party licensed OTT content and communications services, e.g. Blackberry application.
Uses or does not use the location information
Retention Obligation
Disclosure Obligation
Power of agencies to access and use the information
disclosed. This gap serves as an accidental privacy protection mechanism, although it may not have been deliberate, but it may be complemented with an undefined regime that exists in parallel to the Regime. This parallel regime creates the opportunity for the agencies to harvest location information from online social networks and using Big Data analytics to extract location information that could be used for law enforcement activities (Minister for Justice, 2016) and (Participant, 2016) . Big data used in a law enforcement context provides a substantial mechanism to revealing threats and unlocking criminal plans hidden within data-rich environments such as social media or news reporting.
The Coalition Government is funding this technology so our law enforcement agencies can engage the latest tools to overlay big data information with existing intelligence. ' (Minister for Justice, 2016: p. 1) (emphasis added).
And
Open source social media provides a large data set -subsequently providing linkages and other in depth intelligence on terrorist groups from their members (Minister for Justice, 2016: p. 1) (emphasis added).
And:
The sheer volume of associated data from the IS online onslaught has created a windfall of intelligence, and gives tremendous insight into terrorist organisations and also insight into operational activity from geo-location, to unintentionally leaked plans or photos, (Minister for Justice, 2016: p. 1) (emphasis added).
The reference to social media and insight into the geo-location of targets is a reference to the LCS functionality used in social network applications that are provided OTT. The legal exceptions discussed above places limitations on the TelCo to retain location information and location identifiers in respect of OTT content and communications services. The location information may not be sourced directly from the Category A or B TelCo, as social networking applications are OTT content and communications services provided by a third party, and therefore would be excluded from the retention obligations. The TelCo may therefore be unable to disclose the information the agencies seek. The law enforcement posts instead. The law enforcement agency is accessing the information directly from the social networking content uploaded by the individual or by directly approaching the social networking website for assistance (Minister for Justice, 2016) and (Participant, 2016) . The location information obtained from social networking websites may be used to complement the location information and location identifiers collected from the TelCo or to fill the gap.
The question is whether this action requires a standardised governance framework, as is the case in respect of the TelCo.
The justification is that the information is OSINT. The individual may choose to disclose his/her location online. However, it is concerning that the law sends the message about data minimisation, by not requiring the retention of location information in respect of third party online applications on the one hand, but then does not address the harvesting of location information directly from the websites that is an OTT content and communications service.
The user intends to only disclose its location to friends and family and may not accept to be trolled, even by law enforcement agencies without a judicial warrant.
The ASIO on the other hand, is adamant it is not trawling through data for security purposes. We can only ever legislatively look for material, seek data, when we believe there is a nexus to security. We do not have the resources, ability, time, energy or inclination to be trawling. These are selective. We are looking at individuals of security concern.
The concern expressed by some in the public -that we monitor communications of all Australians and that we are seeking to do that and that this would provide thatis erroneous. (Hartland, 2014) .
Furthermore, the AFP requested the disclosure of MAC addresses directly from Apple (AFP, 2016: p. 18) . This is because the TelCo may not have visibility of the MAC address (Participant, 2016) . Apple is not a licensed carrier or a CSP and is therefore not subject to the 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Whereas the locally-licensed and locally-based TelCo is subject to retention and disclosure obligations, the Free and Invoiced Content and Communications Service Providers are not regulated. This situation is a cause for alarm to the industry:
This is a real tension in our telecommunications regime, because, the metadata retention obligation is only applied to carriers and carriage service providers. You have to be 'a service for carrying communications or enabling communications carried by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy or both'. So, if you are an OTT provider, no metadata, unless you happen to be a service sold by a carrier or a CSP (Fair, 2016) . uses to access and use a service, or the platform via which the service is provided, or the category of TelCo that provides the service, should not solely dictate privacy protections. In doing so, the Regime does not properly consider the full range of services, the infrastructure platforms used, the role players and the impact of reducing protections and increasing the powers of the agencies, in a contradictory manner.
The various formats of accessing and using communications need to be fully considered and the appropriate levels of protections, disclosure guidelines, discretionary retention by the
TelCo and the open access by the agencies to information that would otherwise be restricted by law may need to be fully aligned to the Regime.
